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The impact of space weather on the power grid is a tangible and recurring threat with potentially 
serious consequences on society. Of particular concern is the long-distance high-voltage power grid, 
which is vulnerable to the effects of geomagnetic storms that can damage or destroy equipment or lead 
to grid collapse. 
 
In order to launch a dialogue on the topic and encourage authorities, regulators and operators in 
Europe and North America to learn from each other, the European Commission’s Joint Research 
Centre, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, and NOAA’s Space Weather Prediction Centre, 
with the contribution of the UK Civil Contingencies Secretariat, jointly organised a workshop on the 
impact of extreme space weather on the power grid on 29-30 October 2013. Topics addressed were 
space-weather phenomena and the dynamics of their impact on the grid, experiences with prediction 
and now-casting in the USA and in Europe, risk assessment and preparedness, as well as policy 
implications arising from increased awareness of the space-weather hazard. 
 
The “Space Weather and Power Grids” workshop was attended by 50 representatives from European 
and North American power-grid operators, regulators, emergency-response organisers, space-weather 
experts, academia, the European Space Agency and the European Commission.  
 
The main workshop conclusions are: 
 
• There is increasing awareness of the risk of space-weather impact among power-grid operators 
and regulators and some countries consider it a priority risk to be addressed. 
• The predictability of space-weather phenomena is still limited and relies, in part, on data from 
ageing satellites. NOAA is working with NASA to launch the DSCOVR solar-wind spacecraft, 
the replacement for the ACE satellite, in early 2015.  
• In some countries, models and tools for GIC prediction and grid impact assessment have been 
developed in collaboration with national power grids but equipment vulnerability models are 
scarce. 
• Some countries have successfully hardened their transmission grids to space-weather impact and 
sustained relatively little or no damage due to currents induced by past moderate space-weather 
events. 
• While there is preparedness in industry against moderate space weather, the vulnerability of the 
power grid with respect to Carrington-type events is less conclusive and needs to be assessed. 
• The assessment of space-weather impact on society needs to consider possible interdependencies 
between critical infrastructures. These interdependencies are not routinely assessed. 
• Effective risk communication is required to bridge the gap between science and policy and to 
convey the significance of scientific results to decision makers. 
• Emergency-response planning for a severe space-weather event needs to consider the full range of 
potential impacts on critical infrastructure. 
• For a severe geomagnetic storm inter-institutional and probably international emergency planning 
efforts are required as response capabilities of individual countries might be overloaded.  
• In the USA work is in progress to augment the existing regulatory requirements for power-grid 
operations by introducing new standards to better meet the challenges posed by space-weather risk. 
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Many critical infrastructures on the ground and in space are vulnerable to the impact of severe space 
weather. Of particular concern is the long-distance high-voltage power grid, which is vulnerable to the 
effects of geomagnetic storms through the induction of Geomagnetically Induced Currents (GICs) that 
can damage or destroy equipment or lead to grid collapse due to cascading effects. While there is 
some awareness and knowledge among power-grid operators and regulators of the space-weather 
hazard, levels of awareness, as well as vulnerabilities, differ from country to country and regionally 
within North America. 
 
In order to launch a dialogue on the topic and encourage authorities, regulators and operators in 
European countries and North America to learn from each other, the European Commission’s Joint 
Research Centre (JRC), the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), and NOAA’s Space 
Weather Prediction Centre (SWPC), with the contribution of the UK Civil Contingencies Secretariat, 
jointly organised a 2-day technical workshop on the impact of extreme space weather on the power 
grid on 29-30 October 2013 at the JRC’s Ispra site. Topics discussed were space-weather phenomena 
and the dynamics of their impact on the grid, experiences with prediction and now-casting in the USA 
and in Europe, risk assessment and preparedness, as well as policy implications possibly arising from 
increased awareness of the space-weather hazard. 
 
The “Space Weather and Power Grids” workshop was attended by 50 representatives from European 
and North American transmission-grid operators, regulators, emergency-response organisers, space-
weather experts, academia, the European Space Agency and the European Commission. The workshop 
programme and the list of participants are provided in Annex 1 and 2. 
2. Summary of topical key findings 
 
The workshop was structured into six sessions, each addressing a specific topic related to the impact 
of space weather on the power grid. The speakers represented various stakeholder groups in Europe, 
North America and South Africa, and included academia, utilities and regulatory bodies who 
commented on the topic from diverse technical, operational and organisational perspectives. In the 
following sections, the main conclusions from the workshop sessions are summarised. 
2.1 Session 1: Awareness, policy action and international 
cooperation 
In this session a panel of five senior speakers from Europe and the USA, including representatives of 
the Swedish MSB, the UK Civil Contingencies Secretariat, the US Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC), the US Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the European 
Commission discussed strategic and policy issues related to severe space weather and its potential 
impact on infrastructures. 
 
During the discussions it was acknowledged that awareness of the space-weather risk is increasing. It 
was pointed out that a validated space-weather risk and impact assessment was required to facilitate 
the promotion and prioritisation of policy action. This assessment needs to take into account the 
growing interconnectedness of society and the ripple effect possibly caused by the disruption of one or 
several critical infrastructures. The European Commission has been tasked with establishing a list of 
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 priority risks the EU is facing and has been providing guidance to Member States in preparing national 
risk assessments. Four European countries (The Netherlands, UK, Sweden and Norway) have 
identified severe space weather as a major threat to their infrastructures and consequently to society, 
and they have included reasonable worst-case scenarios in their national risk assessment (Sweden will 
begin preparing national risk scenarios for space weather in 2014).   
 
The outcome of risk assessment studies feeds directly into the development of contingency plans that 
will guide emergency response when a severe event occurs. In this context, costs can be reduced by 
preparing for common consequences of emergencies rather than for every individual emergency 
scenario. The generic response capabilities already in place or subsequently created are then 
applicable to various domains. This can be augmented by capacity building to address specific risks, 
should such a need be identified. This approach is being developed in the UK. In addition, effective 
risk communication needs to ensure that the information disseminated before or after an event is 
understood, with particular attention to bridging the gap between science and policy. 
 
In the USA, there are significant legislative developments: FERC has issued a rule on the development 
of grid reliability standards for geomagnetic disturbances in 20131. While this rule is goal-oriented 
and does not prescribe methods on how to achieve its objectives, it requires that risk mitigation plans 
and procedures be coordinated across the region and throughout the interconnections. FEMA has 
prepared a draft federal response plan for space weather which is proposed to be added to the long-
term power outage annex of the Response Federal Interagency Operations Plan. 
                                                
 
The key points from Session 1 are: 
• Understanding the space-weather impact on critical infrastructures is a multidisciplinary problem 
and requires the involvement of scientists, engineers, operators and policy makers. 
• There is increasing awareness of the space-weather threat among operators and regulators and 
some countries have included it in their national risk-assessment programmes as a priority risk to 
be addressed. 
• Interdependencies between infrastructures require a holistic approach to understand the 
consequences of severe space weather on society as a whole. 
• There is a need for integrated risk assessment to promote and prioritise policy action. The results 
of this risk assessment need to be translated into contingency plans to guide response actions. 
• Many countries have generic response capacities to deal with the consequences of all kinds of 
hazards. For some hazards, however, specific contingency plans are also needed, and space 
weather may be one such hazard. 
• Effective risk communication is required to bridge the gap between science and policy and to 
convey the significance of scientific results to decision makers. 
• In the USA, legislation on ensuring power-grid reliability under geomagnetic-storm conditions 
and emergency-response plans are available at federal level. In addition, a validated notification 
procedure is in place between federal agencies and the power industry in case of an imminent 
geomagnetic storm.   
 
1 Order No. 779 on “Reliability Standards for Geomagnetic Disturbances”. It requires the preparation of 
operating procedures to mitigate the effects of geomagnetic storms in a first step (January 2014), and 
subsequently vulnerability assessments and mitigation plans from owners and operators (January 2015). 
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 2.2 Session 2: Space weather and GICs 
Four speakers from Göttingen University, the Finnish Meteorological Institute, the British Geological 
Survey, and the University of Cape Town provided an introduction to the solar phenomena that can 
give rise to GICs on Earth, and discussed the analysis of GIC occurrences and modelling initiatives in 
the UK, Ireland and South Africa. In addition, the European 7th Framework Programme project 
EURISGIC was presented. 
 
The session started with a discussion of the main characteristics of Coronal Mass Ejections (CMEs). It 
was highlighted that CMEs are abundant (10,000 during the last solar cycle) although the great 
majority are too slow, not Earth-directed, or have polarity orientation unfavourable for magnetic 
reconnection to trigger severe geomagnetic storms. Of greatest concern are fast CMEs with speeds of 
more than 2,000 km/s. During the last cycle, 40 of these high-energy events were observed. A 
prerequisite for triggering severe geomagnetic storms, magnetic reconnection processes are driven by 
the solar-wind speed and the interplanetary magnetic field (IMF) that has to be oriented southward 
(anti-parallel to Earth’s magnetic field). It was also noted that geomagnetic storms can occur at any 
time during the solar cycle; they are not centred at solar maximum. With respect to seasonal effects, it 
appears that events which take place in and around April and September are more likely to lead to 
relatively high levels of geomagnetic activity (Kp > 8
2).  
 
In contrast to GIC nowcasting, which can provide accurate results if measured real-time magnetic-
field data is available, the forecasting of GICs is not yet mature as it relies on the estimation of ground 
magnetic fields. The EURISGIC project works towards establishing a European prototype forecasting 
service to produce real-time GIC warnings for the high-voltage power grid. The underlying 
assumption is that the conductor system can be modelled using a DC model. The results suggest that 
determination of the maximum magnetic-field variation over time for a given time period (e.g. 30 
minutes) is an achievable goal. In addition, the project statistically analyses historical geomagnetic-
field measurements in combination with a simplified grid model to derive the probabilities of major 
GICs and to define worst-case scenarios. Based on the analysis of European data for 1996-2008, the 
largest modelled 1-minute GIC values in the European high-voltage power grid were found in 
Northern Europe and more specifically in the south of Norway (400A). Since this data only covers one 
solar cycle, higher GICs are likely in case of a Carrington-type event. 
 
In several countries (e.g. United States, Canada, UK, Ireland, South Africa) the power industry is 
collaborating with scientists to help develop models and tools for GIC prediction and grid impact 
assessment. In a joint effort between industry and scientists, operational services have been developed 
that provide information on geomagnetic activity and predicted GICs to the transmission grids. In this 
context, the need for more magnetometer stations to achieve higher-resolution measurements of the 
magnetic field variation was emphasised. For the UK and Ireland, simplified high-voltage power 
network models were created and subsequently validated against the 2003 Halloween storm. A 
Carrington-type event was also simulated, assuming its severity to be eight times that of the 2003 
storm. While it is uncertain if this assumption is justified, under these conditions the simulation yields 
GICs of several hundred A in parts of the UK power grid. With respect to the vulnerability of grid 
components it was noted that the risk of space-weather impact on transformers may be underestimated. 
When exposing a transformer of the South African operator ESKOM to a DC of 50 A, rapid heating 
was unexpectedly found. With some of ESKOM’s 100 step-up transformers already slightly damaged 
                                                 
2 The planetary index Kp provides a measure of the level of geomagnetic activity over a three-hour interval 
based on magnetometer measurements. The index ranges from 0 to 9. 
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 by previous space-weather events, there is a high likelihood that in case of an extreme event, which is 
expected to create electric fields of 3-4 V/km (1-minute values), several might be destroyed. 
 
The main conclusions from Session 2 are: 
• Geomagnetic observatories are mainly concentrated in the northern hemisphere. More 
magnetometers should be installed to understand the variability of the magnetic disturbance 
locally or regionally. 
• While nowcasting of GICs provides accurate results, forecasting is technically feasible but not yet 
mature. 
• In some countries, models and tools for GIC prediction and grid impact assessment have been 
developed in collaboration with national power grids.  
• The risk of space-weather impact on power-grid components may be underestimated. Even small 
GICs have been found to cause transformer damage, possibly leading to rapid or delayed failure. 
• Although progress has been made in predictive modelling, further research and validation is 
needed. 
2.3 Session 3: Canadian experience including a severe event 
In this session, a speaker from Natural Resources Canada outlined the events around the 1989 
geomagnetic storm that severely affected parts of the Canadian power grid and discussed steps taken 
to improve GIC forecasting capabilities3.  
 
Being the first major power outage due to space weather, the Hydro-Quebec blackout was a wake-up 
call for the power industry worldwide. In addition, the loss of power affected industrial production in a 
number of other sectors. This event changed the risk landscape and posed a challenge both to scientists, 
who were required to improve their understanding of the geomagnetic activity, and to industry, which 
needed to start considering the risks related to GIC flow in their power systems. In addition, a higher 
accuracy of geomagnetic-activity forecasts (including start time, amplitude, and end time) was 
required to support grid operators. As a consequence, a GIC simulator service was developed in 
collaboration with the Ontario power transmission operator Hydro One that automates steps in GIC 
modelling. This service, which is also available as a standalone version which accepts any grid 
configuration, uses real-time geomagnetic data to calculate the electric field, and then estimates the 
GIC in a connected power system model. A benchmark GIC model is also available to users for 
testing purposes in case they want to set up their own GIC model. 
 
Recently, the geomagnetic and grid conditions at the time of the Hydro-Quebec blackout were 
recreated by the operator based on historical data. The results of this simulation suggest that the cause 
of the blackout was increased reactive power losses that eventually led to voltage collapse at a total 
consumption of 1,770 MVAR4. Following the grid collapse, Hydro-Quebec implemented measures to 
render their transmission network less vulnerable to space-weather impact, e.g. through automated 
undervoltage load shedding and shunt reactor operation, as well as series compensation. Further 
simulations using the power grid’s 2012 configuration and subjecting it to multiples of the 1989 
MVAR consumption indicate that the Hydro-Quebec grid would now remain stable up to almost five 
                                                 
3 Due to technical reasons, the planned video-link with Hydro-Quebec in Montreal could not be established. 
However, their presentation was provided after the workshop and its main conclusions are included in this 
session summary. 
4 The unit MVAR stands for Mega Volt-Ampere-Reactive. It measures reactive power in a transmission grid. 
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 times the 1989 conditions. These simulations, however, did not consider the additional impact of other 
potential GIC-related problems, such as transformer heating, harmonics, voltage asymmetry, etc.  
 
The key findings from Session 3 are: 
• The collapse of the Hydro-Quebec network in 1989 led to the realisation that magnetic storms can 
adversely affect power systems and was a wakeup call for the power industry. 
• Recent studies by Hydro-Quebec that recreated the 1989 geomagnetic and power-grid conditions 
showed that the likely cause of the blackout was slow voltage collapse due to reactive power 
consumption. 
• The blackout caused ripple effects in several industrial sectors resulting in considerable economic 
losses. 
• Simulations using the 2012 power grid configuration indicate that the Hydro-Quebec grid can 
currently withstand almost five times the 1989 conditions and remain stable. 
• A GIC simulator service using real-time geomagnetic activity data and accepting different grid 
configurations is available to the power industry in Canada. 
2.4 Session 4: USA experience – NOAA’s facilities and their use 
In Session 4, four speakers from NOAA and PJM5, the largest electricity operator in North America, 
introduced the monitoring and prediction facilities of NOAA’s Space Weather Prediction Centre and 
discussed the real-time use of the SWPC’s products. 
 
The SWPC is the official source of space-weather alerts and warnings in the USA. For risk 
communication purposes NOAA has developed five-tier severity scales for radio blackouts, radiation 
storms and geomagnetic storms. In a video link with the SWPC in Boulder the space-weather 
notification process was outlined. When the SOHO or STEREO satellites observe a CME directed 
towards Earth a geomagnetic storm watch is issued. This is followed by a warning when the CME hits 
the ACE satellite6 1-3 days later at which point first indications of the orientation of the IMF become 
available. Warnings are typically issued 15-45 minutes before geomagnetic storm onset. Once the 
CME impacts the geomagnetic field and the storm begins, the SWPC issues an alert. In this context it 
was noted that the NOAA space-weather scales saturate for Kp = 9 events which causes the very large 
and really extreme events to be assigned the same severity value. In case of necessity, the SWPC 
notifies its customers and government directly via telephone to circumvent this problem. 
 
While there is progress in model development, forecasting capabilities are still limited due to gaps in 
understanding the orientation of the IMF with respect to the Earth’s magnetic field at the time of the 
occurrence of the CME at the Sun. The CME must reach the ACE spacecraft for forecasters to get a 
good understanding of the IMF and the likely intensity of the ensuing geomagnetic storm. The SWPC 
is working closely with the US Geological Survey (USGS) on the development of an Electric-field (E-
field) model. The first step will be to accurately specify the E-field - a nowcast product that essentially 
captures the current conditions regionally. The SWPC is also working with NASA on the transition of 
a geospace model. This model will assess and eventually forecast how the magnetosphere responds to 
a CME and will be a key element in the effort to forecast electric fields. NOAA also collaborates 
actively with the USGS to improve ground-conductivity models. A sparseness of magnetometer 
                                                 
5 Pennsylvania, Jersey, Maryland Power Pool. 
6 The ACE (Advanced Composition Explorer) satellite is positioned at the L1 Lagrange point at a distance of 
about 1.5 million km from the Earth. 
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 stations was noted and more are needed to establish a satisfactory baseline for the magnetic field, 
ideally in the vicinity of conductivity boundaries or where physical infrastructures are located.  
 
The predictability of space-weather phenomena is still limited and partly relies on data from ageing 
satellites. However, NOAA is working with NASA to launch the DSCOVR spacecraft in early 2015. 
DSCOVR will replace the ACE spacecraft and ensure continuity of solar wind measurements and the 
critical short-term, high-confidence geomagnetic storm warnings. There are also exciting new 
initiatives underway that may produce important breakthroughs such as the Sunjammer mission. 
Sunjammer, scheduled for launch in 2015, is a solar sail demonstration/research mission which 
deploys a huge, ultra-thin sail, using the pressure of sunlight to provide propellant-free transport. This 
technology will allow for an operating location further away from Earth than the L1 orbit and provide 
much needed additional lead time (one hour) to geomagnetic-storm warnings. 
 
PJM Interconnection, which is a part of the Eastern Interconnection grid in the USA, coordinates the 
movement of electricity in all or parts of 13 US states and the District of Columbia, thereby serving 61 
million people. GIC monitoring was put in place following the 1989 storm when a generator step-up 
transformer at the Salem nuclear power plant failed due to GICs. Procedures have not greatly changed 
since and current operational mitigation strategies foresee a more conservative way to operate the grid 
when measured GIC magnitudes persist for 10 minutes above a threshold of 10A. This includes the 
resetting of transfer limits, redispatching of generation, reducing transformer loading, and increasing 
voltage. The existing measures should provide protection from the effects of moderate geomagnetic 
storms but there is concern about the potential impact of severe space weather. As a consequence, 
PJM has started investigating reactive power losses and studies the maximum credible GIC scenario to 
better understand the grid response to extreme events.  Following the 2003 Northeast blackout in 
North America, PJM has implemented measures to be better prepared for reactive power losses. It 
judges that these measures will also help to render the grid less vulnerable against GIC impact. 
 
The main conclusions from Session 4 are: 
• There is a broad range of SWPC products available that support numerous industrial sectors in 
better protecting their infrastructures and services. 
• The NOAA space-weather scales saturate for Kp = 9 events which causes the very large and really 
extreme events to be assigned the same severity value. 
• Mid- to long-range forecasting is hampered by the limited understanding of the IMF’s orientation 
with respect to Earth’s magnetic field. 
• The predictability of space-weather phenomena is still limited and partly relies on data from 
ageing satellites. NOAA is working with NASA to launch the DSCOVR spacecraft in early 2015 
to replace the ACE satellite and ensure continuity of solar-wind measurements and the critical 
short-term, high-confidence geomagnetic-storm warnings.  
• Some electricity operators have GIC monitoring and operational strategies in place against 
moderate space-weather events. 
• Measures to make the power grid more resilient against conventional blackouts may 
coincidentally help to render the grid less vulnerable against GIC impact. 
• From a GIC point of view, the length of the whole power system is of importance rather than the 
length of individual lines.  
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 2.5 Session 5: Risk assessment and management 
Discussing more generally the space-weather disaster risk management cycle, six speakers from 
NASA, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), the JRC, UK National Grid and 
the UK Civil Contingencies Secretariat addressed prevention, preparedness and response aspects. 
 
For prevention and mitigation purposes it is important to know the severity of extreme events, 
information which then filters into scenario building and risk assessment. Given its direct applicability 
to subsequent engineering analyses the determination of the geo-electric field is of particular 
importance. Approaches to derive electric-field scenarios are either event-based (historical storm data), 
statistical (magnetometer data and extrapolation), theoretical (state-of-the-art models), or a mix of 
these three. First results at NASA indicate that state-of-the-art models manage to provide a fairly 
accurate representation of the electric field observed during the Halloween storm. This suggests that 
models have the capability to reproduce realistic extreme conditions. The studies also show that in 
case of an extreme geomagnetic storm the event boundary would move south towards 40 degrees 
magnetic latitude. 
 
NASA and NOAA closely work together with NERC, a non-profit organisation responsible for 
establishing and enforcing mandatory electric reliability standards with authority in the US and 
Canada and subject to oversight from FERC and Canadian authorities. In response to NERC’s 2012 
report on the effects of geomagnetic disturbances on the bulk power system, a GMD7 task force was 
formalised to develop methodologies and tools for industry to assess the risk of geomagnetic storms 
and rank mitigation options. These tools are tailored for use by operators and planners. NERC also 
operates a voluntary spare-equipment database with a focus on long lead-time equipment to facilitate 
the recovery process in case of a severe event. The products and schedule of the GMD task force are 
aligned with the requirements of FERC Order No. 779.  
 
The UK National Grid carried out an assessment of the potential space-weather risks to their 
transmission system. Widespread transformer damage and the subsequent collapse of the 
interconnected grid are considered extremely unlikely. A Carrington-type storm, assumed to have a 
100-year return period, would damage a small number of transformers and in spite of high financial 
losses to the operator, there would be little impact on the end users. Other effects of space weather, 
such as reactive power loss and harmonic effects, or transformer degradation, are expected to be more 
frequent but are considered low-impact events with local, temporary effects. National Grid relies on 
operational and design mitigation to cope with geomagnetic storms. Operational measures include the 
return to service of all circuits, extra reactive power support, or the connection of all Supergrid 
transformers to distribute the GIC. Design measures provide for inherent security and include GIC-
resistant transformer design, a higher number of transformer spares, voltages below 400 kV, etc. 
National Grid has also commissioned studies to develop transformer fragility functions with respect to 
GIC impact. Assuming a 1 in 100-year event, it is estimated that at most 10-20 transformers would 
suffer thermal damage and be taken out of service. This constitutes 1% of all transformers in the grid. 
With the available transformer spares an event of such magnitude is considered manageable. Space-
weather protocols and emergency-information exchange between the stakeholders are tested during 
targeted control-room exercises. 
 
The UK Civil Contingencies Secretariat is developing national multi-stakeholder response plans for 
space weather, taking into account the wide range of potential impacts, such as loss of power, 
disruption of HF and satellite communications, GPS, etc. Emergency response can be complicated by 
interdependencies between critical-infrastructure sectors, a potential vulnerability that is not always 
                                                 
7 GMD: Geomagnetic disturbance 
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 fully assessed. For instance, many infrastructure sectors are critically dependent on the availability of 
electricity. Should the power grid be affected, there will be ripple effects throughout society. 
Increasing the resilience of the grid is therefore of paramount importance. In this context it was 
pointed out that operators have to be aware that the reliance of Smart grids on GPS timing potentially 
adds vulnerability to the grid. Currently, loss of GPS capability is not a problem for the UK power 
industry as critical transmission-grid systems use atomic clocks as timing backup. An emergency 
exercise simulating the local loss of the power grid is planned for April 2014. With respect to space-
weather forecasting and prediction, the UK Met Office has created its own capabilities and is 
developing its capability and mechanisms to provide alerts to industry and government. 
 
For assessing the overall risk of space-weather impact on society due to loss of power, severe 
geomagnetic-storm scenarios, network disruption models and loss-estimation methods have to be 
coupled. This integrated modelling system also needs to be able to account for possible 
interdependencies. The JRC has developed a platform for assessing the risk and resilience of critical 
infrastructures with a focus on interdependencies. Provided that impact models are available, this 
platform is generally applicable to all types of incident triggers, and hence also to space-weather 
impact. 
 
Following the conclusions of the 2011 Space-Weather Awareness Dialogue8, the JRC asked whether 
there would be support for an emergency exercise to provide a stress test for response capabilities both 
nationally and internationally. A severe geomagnetic storm would put several complex critical-
infrastructure systems into interaction with each other, and a dedicated exercise would help to identify 
gaps and weaknesses in emergency procedures. Generally, the idea was well received, in particular to 
test stakeholder responsibilities and communication protocols. There was some scepticism as to the 
carrying out a full-blown emergency exercise which might be too ambitious. Rather, there should be a 
focus on specific aspects of the problem.  
 
The key findings from Session 5 are: 
• Initial modelling efforts of severe-event scenarios suggest that there is the capability to reproduce 
realistic extreme conditions.  
• It is expected that during a Carrington-type occurrence the event boundary would move southward 
towards 40 degrees magnetic latitude. This would encompass a significant part of Europe and 
North America. 
• The design-basis reference geomagnetic storm needs to be defined for benchmarking purposes. 
• The risk assessment of space-weather impact on society needs to consider possible 
interdependencies between critical infrastructures. These interdependencies are not routinely 
assessed. 
• Scenario development and risk assessment efforts are hampered by a lack of equipment 
vulnerability models. Efforts are underway to close this gap. 
• In some countries there are concerns about limited availability of spare transformers and a lack of 
manufacturing capacity. 
• Emergency-response planning for a severe space-weather event needs to consider the full range of 
possibly affected critical infrastructures. 
• With the use of Smart grids and the increased dependence on GPS timing the power industry 
might be inadvertently building additional vulnerability into their systems. 
                                                 
8 E. Krausmann (2011) The Space-Weather Awareness Dialogue: Findings and Outlook, EUR 25016 EN. 
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 • Developing a common language between scientists and engineers facilitates risk communication. 
• A severe geomagnetic storm would affect large geographical areas simultaneously and cause 
ripple effects due to interdependencies between affected critical infrastructures. This requires 
inter-institutional and probably international response planning efforts as response capabilities of 
individual countries might be overloaded. It might be beneficial to test certain aspects of the 
response during a dedicated international emergency exercise. 
2.6 Session 6: Looking forward: operator requirements and 
regulation 
The workshop concluded with a discussion of operator and regulatory requirements with contributions 
from Norwegian and Swedish transmission grid operators, FERC and ESA.  
 
Sweden has significant experience with geomagnetic disturbances that caused the tripping of overhead 
lines, transformers or shunt reactors. However, space weather has on no occasion resulted in damage 
to the transmission system. Based on lessons learned from past experiences, an improved earth fault 
protection system was introduced to achieve selective tripping. Transformers were hardened through 
design, and today about two thirds of the transformers in the transmission system are 3-limbed, 3-
phase core transformers that can withstand a DC of 200 A for 10 minutes in the neutral at full AC load. 
The remainder of the transformers do not fulfil these specifications as they are older. As an additional 
precautionary measure, no critical transmission grid-system is dependent on GPS. The robustness of 
the system to moderate space weather was proven during several G4 and G5 events (on the NOAA 
scale) where only tripping occurred in a few cases. With respect to a Carrington-type event or worse, 
the Swedish National Grid believes that the transmission grid will collapse due to reactive power 
consumption and voltage instability before transformers can incur any serious damage. In this case, 
post-collapse start-up times are estimated to be about one hour for the transmission grid, and six to 
eight hours for the distribution network. 
 
The Norwegian transmission grid also experienced several cases of small (5-15 A) to higher (>20A) 
GIC events. The highest GIC measured was 40 A in a transformer neutral. This resulted in a voltage 
drop of 1-2 kV in a 420 kV system which is, however, not considered problematic. GICs are measured 
at six monitoring stations in the south and north of the country with the aim to establish a correlation 
between the Kp index and GIC levels in transformers. Norway has to date not suffered any blackouts 
or partial transmission-grid outages due to space weather. With respect to the impact of an extreme 
geomagnetic storm, the Norwegian grid operator also judges that the transmission grid will collapse 
due to voltage instability before critical network components are seriously damaged or fail. 
Nonetheless, to mitigate the risk associated with space weather operators need advance information on 
potential events affecting Earth. Early warning on solar activity is required with a lead time of 3-4 
days. Once it is certain that a CME is Earth-directed (1-3 days before impact), information on affected 
regions, the likely strength of the geomagnetic storm, and the time of impact is needed. When the 
geomagnetic storm is imminent (2-4 hours desired lead time), the operator requires information on the 
potential regional effects, the Kp index, and the expected duration of the event. 
 
ESA has generated a set of technology roadmaps, one of which is in the space-weather effects domain. 
The energy sector was identified as a potential area for service deployment using space systems. As a 
consequence, the Space and Energy roadmap was consolidated with a focus on power grids, taking as 
a starting point the Space Situational Awareness programme preparatory phase. Subsequently, high-
priority technology fields of interest for collaboration with the energy sector were identified: For 
forecasting purposes, solar wind measurements and models relating solar-wind data to geomagnetic 
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 disturbances and GIC, are of crucial importance. Geomagnetic and GIC models are critical for the 
specification of extreme events. The roadmap is currently in the review phase and will eventually be 
implemented through ESA’s technology programmes. 
 
Before the 1960s, several storms with severities higher than that of the 1989 event occurred and yet no 
major impacts are documented. In the USA, the expansion of the power grid to extremely high voltage 
started in the 1960s and FERC considers it possible that this caused vulnerabilities to unknowingly be 
introduced into the transmission system. Some design and operational mitigation measures are in place, 
and there is hope that the US power grid can withstand a 1989-type of storm. The current regulatory 
framework is in the process of being updated to better meet the challenges of potential space-weather 
impact on the power grid. In this context it was emphasised that the main objective of the new 
legislation is to guarantee the continued functioning of the grid rather than protect the system’s 
hardware. As a consequence, grid collapse rather than widespread transformer damage or failure is 
also not considered an acceptable option when there is the capability to prevent it from happening. 
 
The key points from Session 6 are: 
• Some countries have successfully hardened their transmission grids to space-weather impact and 
sustained relatively little or no damage due to currents induced by past moderate space-weather 
events. 
• While there is preparedness in industry against moderate space weather, the vulnerability of the 
power grid with respect to Carrington-type events is less conclusive and needs to be assessed 
further. 
• In some European countries it is believed that in the case of a severe space-weather event the grid 
will collapse due to reactive power consumption and voltage instability before transformers can be 
damaged. However, grid collapse might not be an acceptable consequence. 
• Operators require early-warning information that includes the strength of the geomagnetic storm, 
the regions it will affect and the time and duration of impact to mitigate the risk to the power grid. 
• There are existing or planned European space-weather forecasting capabilities but further 
developments are needed. This includes agreement on how best to share forecasts and alerts more 
widely. 
• In the USA work is in progress to augment the existing regulatory requirements for power-grid 
operation by introducing new standards to better meet the challenges posed by space-weather risk. 
3. Conclusions and recommendations 
 
The impact of space weather on the power grid is a tangible and recurring threat with potentially 
serious consequences on society. Moreover, unlike for most other risks, the assessment of space-
weather impact requires a multidisciplinary effort by scientists, engineers, operators of critical 
infrastructures, and policy makers. The discussions during the workshop showed that industry is 
increasingly aware of the possible impact of geomagnetic storms on their transmission grids, and 
regulatory bodies are updating legislation to address the challenges posed by space-weather risk. This, 
coupled with industry’s experience with moderate space-weather events, has led to design 
improvements to harden critical transmission-grid components, as well as to the preparation of 
operational mitigation measures. Nonetheless, for both Europe, North America and South Africa the 




 The workshop participants welcomed the initiative by the JRC, MSB and NOAA to organise this 
event and to provide a forum of exchange among the relevant stakeholders. The discussions helped to 
establish the status quo and identify gaps, while at the same time providing a basis for the 
prioritisation of actions for future incident prevention and consequence mitigation. The main 
conclusions of the workshop can be summarised as follows: 
• There is increasing awareness of the risk of space-weather impact among power-grid operators 
and regulators and some countries consider it a priority risk to be addressed. 
• The predictability of space-weather phenomena is still limited and relies, in part, on data from 
ageing satellites. NOAA is working with NASA to launch the DSCOVR solar-wind spacecraft, 
the replacement for the ACE satellite, in early 2015.  
• In some countries, models and tools for GIC prediction and grid impact assessment have been 
developed in collaboration with national power grids but equipment vulnerability models are 
scarce. 
• Some countries have successfully hardened their transmission grids to space-weather impact and 
sustained relatively little or no damage due to currents induced by past moderate space-weather 
events. 
• While there is preparedness in industry against moderate space weather, the vulnerability of the 
power grid with respect to Carrington-type events is less conclusive and needs to be assessed. 
• The assessment of space-weather impact on society needs to consider possible interdependencies 
between critical infrastructures. These interdependencies are not routinely assessed. 
• Effective risk communication is required to bridge the gap between science and policy and to 
convey the significance of scientific results to decision makers. 
• Emergency-response planning for a severe space-weather event needs to consider the full range of 
potential impacts on critical infrastructure. 
• For a severe geomagnetic storm inter-institutional and possibly international emergency planning 
efforts are required as response capabilities of individual countries might be overloaded.  
• In the USA work is in progress to augment the existing regulatory requirements for power-grid 
operations by introducing new standards to better meet the challenges posed by space-weather risk. 
 
Overall, the use of space-weather and ground-conductance data is more widespread in North America 
than in Europe. However, European transmission networks appear to be less vulnerable to 
geomagnetic storms than North American ones. Possible factors could be the reduced exposure due to 
a greater distance from the magnetic pole, lower voltage lines, or different transformer designs. 
Further studies are required to shed light on this issue, in particular in view of strategic decisions to 
upgrade the power grid to more high-voltage lines or to expand the network to areas farther north.  
 
Based on the conclusions of the workshop, recommendations for action targeting stakeholders in 
science, industry and policy were formulated:  
 
Recommendations for science: 
1. The predictability of space-weather phenomena should be improved by updating and validating 
existing models to reduce uncertainties, or by creating new models where necessary.  
2. There is a need for developing integrated risk-assessment methodologies and tools that consider 
potential interdependencies between critical infrastructures. This is essential for providing a 
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 realistic estimate of the impact of severe space weather on the power grid, and as a consequence 
on society.  
3. Benchmark GMD events must be identified to define the severity of geomagnetic storms that 
power-grid operators must look at for potential impacts. This is a prerequisite for adequately 
addressing GMD mitigation strategies. 
4. Impact models for power-grid components are required for worst-case scenario building in support 
of risk assessment. Cooperation with industry should be sought to facilitate this issue.  
5. In order to plan their response decisions, power-grid operators need regional information on the 
expected time and location of impact, as well as on the severity and duration of the geomagnetic 
storm. Forecasting capabilities need to be enhanced to this end. 
6. There is a need for cooperation between industry and science to model the power grid’s response 
behaviour to the impact of GIC, the impact on individual grid components, and appropriate 
countermeasures. 
 
Recommendations for operators: 
1. Operators should be aware of the risks to their transmission systems in case of severe space 
weather when areas normally unaffected by geomagnetic storms are likely to be hit. 
2. Before implementing new technological developments into the power grid, their influence on the 
overall vulnerability of the system to space weather should be assessed. This applies also to other 
sectors, where for risk mitigation is required for potentially vulnerable new technologies. 
3. Consideration of the potentially serious effects of major GICs in power systems should encourage 
operators to harden their systems, and to have response plans ready in case of an alert. 
 
Recommendations for agencies: 
 
Further study is needed in the following areas: 
1. Assessment of the vulnerability of critical infrastructures to severe space weather, and where 
relevant inclusion in overall risk and resilience assessment. 
2. Communication of space weather risk to stakeholders, and ensuring that emergency plans which 
consider the full range of critical infrastructures possibly affected are developed and tested. 
3. Mechanisms to ensure that space-weather alerts are available to all stakeholders. A European 
information-sharing capability on space weather could draw on the example of the European 
Response Coordination Centre. 
4. Development of protocols to ensure consistency in the prediction of geomagnetic storms in both 
timing and intensity by different space-weather service providers. 
5. Identification of the reasons for the differences across countries in the relevant legislative 
frameworks, and consideration of what further measures may be needed to ensure the integrity of 
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The impact of space weather on the power grid is a tangible and recurring threat with potentially serious consequences on 
society. Of particular concern is the long-distance high-voltage power grid, which is vulnerable to the effects of geomagnetic 
storms that can damage or destroy equipment or lead to grid collapse. 
 
In order to launch a dialogue on the topic and encourage authorities, regulators and operators in Europe and North America to 
learn from each other, the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, and NOAA’s 
Space Weather Prediction Centre, with the contribution of the UK Civil Contingencies Secretariat, jointly organised a workshop on 
the impact of extreme space weather on the power grid on 29-30 October 2013. Topics addressed were space-weather 
phenomena and the dynamics of their impact on the grid, experiences with prediction and now-casting in the USA and in Europe, 
risk assessment and preparedness, as well as policy implications arising from increased awareness of the space-weather 
hazard. 
 
The “Space Weather and Power Grids” workshop was attended by 50 representatives from European and North American power-
grid operators, regulators, emergency-response organisers, space-weather experts, academia, the European Space Agency and 
the European Commission. 
 
The main workshop conclusions are: 
 
• There is increasing awareness of the risk of space-weather impact among power-grid operators and regulators and some 
countries consider it a priority risk to be addressed. 
• The predictability of space-weather phenomena is still limited and relies, in part, on data from ageing satellites. NOAA is 
working with NASA to launch the DSCOVR solar-wind spacecraft, the replacement for the ACE satellite, in early 2015.   
• In some countries, models and tools for GIC prediction and grid impact assessment have been developed in collaboration 
with national power grids but equipment vulnerability models are scarce. 
• Some countries have successfully hardened their transmission grids to space-weather impact and sustained relatively little 
or no damage due to currents induced by past moderate space-weather events. 
• While there is preparedness in industry against moderate space weather, the vulnerability of the power grid with respect to 
Carrington-type events is less conclusive and needs to be assessed. 
• The assessment of space-weather impact on society needs to consider possible interdependencies between critical 
infrastructures. These interdependencies are not routinely assessed. 
• Effective risk communication is required to bridge the gap between science and policy and to convey the significance of 
scientific results to decision makers. 
• Emergency-response planning for a severe space-weather event needs to consider the full range of potential impacts on 
critical infrastructure. 
• For a severe geomagnetic storm inter-institutional and probably international emergency planning efforts are required as 
response capabilities of individual countries might be overloaded. 
• In the USA work is in progress to augment the existing regulatory requirements for power-grid operations by introducing 





As the Commission’s in-house science service, the Joint Research Centre’s mission is to provide EU 
policies with independent, evidence-based scientific and technical support throughout the whole policy 
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